The Haqqani Network: Terrorists or Insurgents

The definition of terrorism is broad and open to interpretation. Hoffman, in his book Inside terrorist act, suggests that terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of worship through violence or the threat of violence in the sp atomic number 18-time activity of political change. Schwartz, Dunkel, et al, define terrorism in their Studies in Conflict & international international ampereere act of terrorism article entitled act of terrorism An Identity supposition Perspective, as the deliberate targeting of civilian sites for attacks designed to result in destruction of those sites and/or the injury and death of noncombatant civilians. Together, these two perspectives coupled with personal individuality operator opening and will serve as the basis for an evaluation of the Haqqani intercommunicate and their interrelationships and interactions with know terrorist pigeonholings such as the Taliban and al-Qaida as well as with Pakistans soldiery and government re cognition agencies.The Haqqani Network Who Are They and Why do We kick? The Haqqani interlocking is an Afghan and Pakistani mathematical group of fighters that operates primarily in south sheepskin coatstan as a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban with fill up ties to Pakistans Army and news program agencies (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. -2). The Haqqani communicates leadership social organization is hierarchical in genius with members of the patriarchs family filling top leadership social functions (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. 7). This familial structure is an important cultural identity marker that can serve to conjure up terrorist activities. Furthermore, Schwartz, Dunkel, et al address the family as it relates to upholding honor and avenging wrongs done to the family. This is interesting because regular those who sympathize and support terrorism, but dont actually figure in it, very much share the same level of social identity based upon their group affiliations.This tends to show how the Haqqani network is able to exert its lure over their colleague groups without actually having to be in control of them. It appears to be a symbiotic relationship w present the Haqqani network clearly benefits from bi-directional credibleness of experience with the Taliban and al-Qaida. Rassler et al support this claim when they discuss the relationship between of age(p) Haqqani network leaders and their close operational relationships with the Taliban and al-Qaida, revealing that in that respect is often no distinction.This share identity-based connection legitimizes the Haqqani network with the segment of the Afghan bon ton that believes in radical Islam and jihad. This was evidenced when the Haqqani network helped sustain al-Qaidas relevancy and branding as the leader of the global jihadist movement. All in all, it appears the Haqqani network just wants their proverbial place at the table so to speak. Clearly, it must(prenominal) be working, as current assessments put the strength of the group close to 15,000 fighters. The Haqqani Network Duplicity at WorkAmerican intelligence and military officials claim the Haqqani network is a proxy crusade used by the Pakistani intelligence service Pakistans Inter-Service Intelligence ISI agency to carry out grisly, high-profile attacks. The question here is whether this is a relationship of convenience or an alliance due to shared identity. The secret relationship with ISI coupled with links to al-Qaida and the Taliban clearly shows the need to call for support (e. g. , material, financial, spiritual, etc. ) and ultimately rally the masses behind them.Furthermore, for decades, the Haqqani network has been a mentor to Arab, Uzbek, Chechen, Turkish, and Pakistani jihadists. These associations speak to the core of shared identity and the interactions among the groups, as consort to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al social and cultural identity is create when members come togethe r based upon common beliefs shared across the group, and individualist identity represents personally chosen goals, values, and beliefs coupled with their perspectives of the worldly concern around them.The have of terrorism necessitates (according to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al) that we not only understand the effects of identity, but also the interactions among these levels. In addition, we need to look at the importance of the wider community as Schwartz, Dunkel, et al put it, Without local, and sometimes international support, those engaged in terrorist attacks would aline it substantially more difficult, if not impossible, to conduct their activities. Working with the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Pakistans ISI is a duplicitous role that provides credibility within, and across, multiple dimensions of jihad (Rassler et al.July 14, 2011, p. 5) establishing the shared identity necessary to imbue respect and connectivity as part of an influential group dynamic. Why is all this important ? The Haqqani networks credibility in the region, especially with the tribal groups of Afghanistan, helps extend the Talibans reach and because the Haqqani network is strong militarily, they act as a force multiplier for the Taliban. This puts the Haqqani network in a regional leadership position, and Schwartz, Dunkel, et al suggest that this leadership role would be considered admirable providing further social capital.The Haqqani Network Terrorist Threat or Insurgency? So with such a significant fighting force that is radicalized, is the Haqqani network a terrorist organization pitted against Western ideology, or is it alone an insurgency focused on eradicating outsiders who have forced their way into the Afghani homeland? According to the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department of State as of family line 15, 2011, the Haqqani network is not listed as a foreign terrorist organization. Despite this, according to the Jamestown Foundation act of terrorism Monitor, The U.S. military has long been frustrated by bad operations carried out against its troops in Afghanistan by Haqqani Network forces. They mention U. S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta as saying, We cannot have the Haqqanis coming across the ensnare attacking our forces and Afghans and disappearing back into a safe haven in Pakistan. In between the rhetoric, the real reason they arent on the terrorist list is because there is a belief that, such a move would scuttle either chances that the group might make peace with Afghanistans government. To make our decision, it is of the essence(p) that we not lose sight of the need to fairly evaluate this group from the point of view of that group and not from the Westernized framework we can comfortably apply to it. Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, point out that, Scholars insistence that terrorists are somehow not like us but, instead, abnormalinsane, power hungry, or a junto of bothis a classic exercise in out-group stereot ypingwhich undermines the analytical emolument of the interpretations in use. Applying this to the Haqqani network and to prevent us from being constrained by our (Western) cultural boundaries, it is incumbent upon us to look at the Haqqani network from their vantage point. The clearest and most-recent message came in phratry of 2011 when Sirajuddin Haqqani (the son of the groups patriarch, Jalaluddin Haqqani) told The telegraph in the United Kingdom via a telephone interview, There are sincere people in the Afghan government who are unwavering to the Taliban as they know our goal is the liberation of our homeland from the clutches of occupying forces. With this, their actions, and their relationships, it is obvious that the Haqqani network is interested more in the local issues and having local ascertain than it is in trying to wage a global jihad against the West. A such, their lack of inclusion from the list of terrorist organizations is still valid. Bibliography Brannan, David W. , Esler, Philip F. , and Strindberg, N. T. Anders. 2001. Talking to Terrorists Towards an Independent uninflected Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism. Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 24, no. 1 3-24. Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, About the Haqqani network. withstand special September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http//news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network Griffin, Emory. A First Look at Communication Theory. tonic York The McGraw-Hill Companies, 1997. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York Columbia University Press, 2006. Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, Brutal Haqqani curse caste Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. Last modify September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http//www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. hypertext markup language? pagewanted=all.Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 11, 2011. www. ctc. usma. edu. Shahzad, Faizul. Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship. Terrorism Monitor. 9. no. 37 (2011) 1-2. http//www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November 10, 2011). Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. Websites reference http//www. cfr. org http//www. tc. usma. edu http//www. dawn. com http//www. foreignaffairs. com http//www. jamestown. org http//news. nationalpost. com http//www. nytimes. com/ http//www. state. gov http//www. telegraph. co. uk http//www. thedailybeast. com http//tribune. com. pk http//www. understandingwar. org/themenode/haqqani-network 1 . Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY Columbia University Press. p. 40. 2 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 537-559. 3 . ibid.(p. 540)Identity hypothesis for our purposes will cover cultural identity, social identity, and personal identity. 4 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. 5 . The Haqqani networks patriarch and leader is Jalaluddin Haqqani, although it is reported that he may be in ill health, and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is running the day-to-day operations. http//www. cfr. org/afghanistan/institute-study-war-haqqani-network/p26126 6 .Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 542. 7 . ibid. 8 . Ibid (p. 548) 9 . Much like the traditional phrase, guilt by association, I suggest there c ould be credibility by association. It is design that is often discussed in marketing whereby a person, product, or caller-out gains credibility by associating itself with a larger more recognized person, product, or company (e. g. , a computer with the Intel Inside sticker on it). 10 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown.The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 40) 11 . Ibid (p. 43). 12 . http//tribune. com. pk/story/259314/sirajuddin-haqqani-dares-us-to-attack-n-waziristan/ 13 . Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. Last modified September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http//www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. html? pagewanted=all. 14 .Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY Columbia University Press. p. 199. 15 . Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, About the Haqqani network. Last modified September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http//news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network 16 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. 17 . Ibid. 18 . Ibid (p. 548) 19 . Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 13) 20 . Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 550. 21 . The current list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations contains 49 entries, but the Haqqani Network is not one of them. http//www. state. gov/s/ct/rls/ some other/des/123085. htm 22 . Faizul S hahzad, Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship, Terrorism Monitor, 9, no. 37 (2011) 1-2, http//www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November